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Christian Conservatism: 
A study in Alienation and Life Style Concerns* 
I( NT p A TEL AND DENNY PlLANT 
s:uthwest Missouri State University 
GARY L. RosE . . 
sacred Heart Umverslty 
•The authors' names are arranged in alphabetical order. This article is a 
revised version of a p~p~r p~esented at the annual meeti':1g of the_ Western 
social Science Assoc1at10n m Albuquerque, New Mexico, Apnl 27-30, 
1983. 
Introduction 
one of the most discernible features of the 1980 presidential and 1982 
congressional elections was the intense campaign effort conducted by a 
number of religious-political organizations. The loose alliance of these 
various organizations has come to be referred to as the New Christian 
Right. The movement was armed with a "hit list" of liberal candidates, 
"moral report cards," and "Christian political action manuals." The goal 
was to mobilize Evangelicals into a potent political force. The spokesmen of 
the various New Christian Right Organizations endorsed "Christian can-
didates" and "Christian issue positions," and took credit for the defeat of 
many well-known liberals and the election of conservative candidates, in the 
1980 elections. However, more recent scholarly analysis of the 1980 election 
returns has cast some doubts on the true impact of the electoral activities of 
the New Christian Right. ' 
The activity of the New Christian Right appears to be more than just a 
passing pheoomena to the extent that the potential may be there to mobilize 
the natural constituency of Evangelicals and born-again Christians in the 
population . A national poll by George Gallup in 1981 found that 380Jo of 
the respondents in the sample identified themselves as born-again Chris-
tians. Nineteen percent of the respondents were classified as Evangelicals. 
The strength of the movement lies primarily in the Southern and border 
states. 2 
The increasing scholarly interest in the study of the New Christian 
Right is reflected in the growing body of literature on this topic. Thus far, a 
substantial number of works have appeared which describe the political 
perspectives and goals of these New Christian Right organizations. 3 While 
such works have increased our knowledge about the New Christian Right 
organizations, research which empirically explores the orientation and 
values of the New Christian Right's target population still remains scarce.• 
The emergence of the New Christian Right is not unique to the extent 
that such "left" and "right" groups have emerged before on the American 
political horizons. In fact, right-wing religion in particular has been a per-
manent feature of the American political scene. Social scientists have 
studied such movements from a variety of perspectives and have provided 
many theoretical models to explain their rise and fall. Two of these models 
are the alienation model and the life style concerns model. 
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This article is based on an empirical study of Evangelic als (The N 
Christian Right's target population) from four counties selected from d~f 
ferent areas of Southern Missouri. The attitudes of Evangelic al and no' · 
evangelical respondents are compared in order to determine if the alienati n-
and/ or life style concerns model provide satisfactory explana tions of t~n 
rise of Christian conservatism as a political movement. e 
Analytic Framework 
The argument that a society based upon the rationa l division of labo 
tends to produce irrational and alienated individuals is a persiste nt theme i~ 
20th Century social and political theory. 5 Traditional societi es, i.e., those 
not based on modern schemes of divided labor, tend to provide more security 
and support for the individual as he/she passes through life. In modern in-
dustrial societies most individuals are employed by large organ ization s and 
live in impersonal urban settings. This latter life style does not provide the 
feelings of support and belonging that traditional society furn ished for the 
individual and tends to produce alienated and anomic individual 
Alienated individuals are those who feel that their vote doesn't count and 
that "they" really run things no mater what actions one takes as an in-
dividual. This feeling is associated with dissatisfaction and lack of trust in 
major American institutions. 
Reinforcing this alienation model are the psychologic al concepts 
employed by Erich Fromm 6 to attempt to explain the rise of Nazism in Germany 
and the Authoritarian Personality Construct of T. W. Adorn o. ' Both of 
these explanatory concepts of the- phenomenon of mass move ments were 
developed after World War II. In I 955 the Alienation Mode l was used by 
Richard Hofstadter, S. M . Lipset, and Daniel Bell' to explain the rise of 
Senator Joe McCarthy and right wing extremism in the United States in the 
l 950's. Their conclusion was that McCarthy's supporters tended to be 
highly disillusioned and dissatisfied with the American poli tical system. 
Moreover, McCa rthy's followers were "anomic individuals" who appeared 
to be projecting their own personal psychological problems into the public 
sector. Hofstadter has linked the irrational behavior of the ra dical right to 
Protestant fundamentalism. 9 
While political alienation has been identified recently as a general 
characteristic of the American public, ' 0 it appears to be most acute among 
distinct population subgroups such as blacks and young people. 11 It has 
been suggested that this decade is marked by the emerge nce of highly 
alienated religious subgroups commonly referred to as an "E vangelical" 
movement. Thus, for example, in reference to' Jerry Falwell and other 
leaders of the moral majority and the New Christian Right, Richard 
Neuhaus argues that: 
They are capitalizing in a deep resentment. They and 
their followers believe that in the past they have been ex-
cluded from and despised by the leadership elites in 
American life. They feel this way because in fact they 
have been excluded and despised . Fundamentalist religion 
was excluded from respectable circles and made oJ;>jects 
of ridicule in the 1920's. Today developments withi n the 
Evangelical-fundamentalist world, combined with the 
growth of the "electronic church," have met with a new 
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conservative coalition in politics to produce what it 
believes is a time of opportunity. 12 
A second major model for analyzing political/religious movements 
s introduced by Max Weber and can be labeled the status politics model. 
w~cording to Weber "status politics" enables the scholar to conceptually 
d' tinguish between groups oriented toward non-material ideals and goals 
1 
the one hand, and groups definable primarily in terms of their relation to 
ononomic, material forces, on the other. Status groups fall into the first 
e~tegory and can be identified in terms of their common life style . 13 S. M . 
~ipset has noted that "The political consequences of status frustrations are 
very different from those resulting from economic deprivation-for while 
•n economic conflict-the goals are clear-a redistribution of income-in 
'iatus conflict there are no clear-cut solutions ." " 
As an analytical tool status politics has several inherent limitations, 
most of which have been amply documented." In particular, the assump-
tion that status politics is inherently abnormal, irrationa l, and interested 
only in symbolic victories seems unjustifiable. A recasting of this model by 
Page and Clelland' 6 appears to have a greater explanatory power. They 
argue that life style concern is the proper model to employ in all conflict in-
volving non-economic belief systems. It is possible to look at conflict in 
non-Marxist (i.e., non-economic) terms and, according to Page and 
Clelland, symbolic conflict is to be expected from human beings who are 
" ymbolic animals who organize the world in symbolic terms."" If a style 
of life can be maintained only if certain social and moral/religious values 
are also retained, then those who see their life style threatened by the ero-
ion of old values or the introduction of new ones can be expected to engage 
in political struggle to maintain their way of life. Moreover, this struggle is 
not over hollow symbols. The participants may feel that their most cherished 
values are being threatened and that their only recourse is to enter the public 
realm. Groups engaged in status politics are not just defending against 
declining prestige but attempting to defend a style of life . 
Methodology 
The data for this article were derived from a survey conducted over a 
period of two weeks during the month of April, 1982. The survey was con-
ducted by telephone using the random digit dialing technique. A list of 
telephone exchanges was obtained from the local directories of the four 
counties included in the survey. Random numbers were generated by com-
puter and combined with the exchange prefix. Three call-backs were made 
at different times to locate respondents who did not answer the telephone. 
The random digit dialing technique eliminated the problem of unlisted 
telephone numbers and new telephone subscribers not listed in the 
telephone directory. 
Our survey sample consisted of persons 18 years and older residing in 
four counties in Southern Missouri-Greene, Vernon, Scott and Cape 
Girardeau. The number of respondents from each county was allocated in 
approximate proportion to the population of counties. All four counties fall 
within the so-called "Bible Belt." 
Using Hunter's proposal for operationalizing Evangelicalism, 11 we 
clas ified as Evangelical only those respondents who agreed with all three of 
the following statements: "Jesus is a divine being and not merely a great 
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historical personage," "the Bible is absolutely true and inerrant " 
"salvation is by faith alone." Those who agreed to none or only one'or ~d 
of these statements were categorized as non-evangelical. Fifty-t hree Per Wo 
of those sampled were identified as Evangelical. ' 9 cent 
Three hundred and six respondents were interviewe d, repre sentin 
response rate of 80%. Almost all of the questions in the questionnaire wg a 
closed-ended . Of our sample, 51 % of the respondents were from contre 
vative Protestant denominations and 26% from liberal Protestt· 
denominations. 20 Of the remainder, 8% were Roman Catholic, 3% Monno~t 
6% listed other religions, while another 6% refused to disclose th . ' 
1. · f Cir re 1g1ous pre erence. 
ANALYSIS OF DA TA 
Demographic Characteristics of Evangelicals and Non-evange/icas Compared 
Our data indicate that there is a slight tendency for Evangelical at-
titudes to increase as age increases while this is not the case with non. 
evangelicals. Evangelicals tend to be found predominantly in the 36-45 age 
group (14.70Jo) and the over 65 group (20.2%), (X 2 = P < = .002, Cramer' s 
V = .24). 
Since women are often found in greater proportions than men in 
church related activity, it was assumed that more women would be iden-
tified as Evangelical than men . Sixty percent of the Evangelicals were 
women, a slightly higher percentage than is the case with no n-evangelicals 
(56%). Similarly, since Evangelicals tend to be more conserv ative (as that 
term is conventionally defined), and since the Republican party tends to be the 
more conservative of the two major parties, one could expect Evangelicals 
to more readily identify with Republicans than with the Democratic party. 
However, our data does not confirm this . While 58% of the Republican s 
identified themselves as Evangelical as compared to 53% of the Democrats, 
this is not a statistically significant difference. 
As education increases Evangelical attitudes tend to decreas e. A ma-
jority, 53 .4%, of the Evangelicals have a high school education or less while 
a majority, 51.1 %, t>f the non-evangelicals have some college or a college 
degree. This is statistically significant (X 2 = p < .001, Cramer's V = .23). 
In regard to church attendance and preferred religious denominations 
significant differences appear between Evangelicals and no n-evangelicals. 
Sixty-nine percent of Evangelicals are concentrated in conserv ative Protes-
tant denominations, while only 31.2% of non-evangelicals att end conser-
vative Protestant churches (X 2 = p < .001; Cramer's V = .40). Seventy-three 
percent of Evangelicals attend church three times a month or more while 
only 44.6% of the non-evangelicals do so (X2 = p < .001; Cramer's V = .34). 
Evangelicals also place a much higher value on the role of religion in 
their daily lives than do non-evangelicals. Seventy-five perce nt of the 
Evangelicals felt that religion is very important in their lives while only 
50.8% of the non-evangelicals expressed the same feeling (X 2 = P < .001; 
Cramer's V = .29). 
The rise of the electronic preacher, with his attenda nt religious 
messages with a highly political content, has raised the spectre (to some) of 
a mobilized religious -political army of Evangelicals causing a political 
"revolution" in the United States. In order to have any influe nce at all 
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one must be receiving these messages from the electronic church. Our 
orne reveal that Evangelicals are much more likely to watch religious 
da_tanted programs on television than are non-evangelicals. Forty-two per-
on~ of the non-evangelicals never watch religious programs on television 
ce;ile only 22.4% of the Evangelicals reported never watching religious-
w ·ented television productions (X2 = P < .001; Cramer's V = .29). This 
on uld seem to indicate that there is a potential Evangelical constituency for 
w~ndidate or candidates who could address public policy issues in a man-
a r appealing to the Evangelicals. 
ne Evangelicals tend to be drawn from different types of occupations than 
on-evangelicals. A greater percentage of Evangelicals are either classified 
0 
retired or perform unskilled labor than is the case with non-evangelicals ()(1 == p < .003; Cramer's V = .26). Non-evangelicals tend to be more heavily 
clustered in the skilled labor, clerical and sales categories compared to the 
Evangelicals. In short, those demographic characteristics which clearly 
separate Evangelicals from non-evangelicals appear to be educational level, 
church attendance, religious denomination, perceived importance of 
religion in daily life, the extent to which religious television programs are 
viewed, age and occupation. 
Our findings are consistent with Gallup's findings 21 that Evangelicals 
include more women, more persons with grade school education and more 
unskilled laborers. Our research also suggests that Evangelicals tend to be 
concentrated among the conservative Protestant denominations. The poten-
tial mass constituency for Christian conservatism is predominantly among 
lower and working class persons. 
FINDINGS 
Alienation Model 
To test the explanatory power of the alienation model we asked a series 
of questions regarding trust in major institutions in American society. 
Many of the general and specific trust items that have been employed in our 
study were obtained from Hill and Luttbeg. 2 2 The alienation model 
hypothesizes that the rise of radical right or Christian conservatism 
movements, such as the Evangelical movement, is due to significant 
dissatisfaction with the major institutions of American society. Moreover, 
this dissatisfaction should be markedly greater than that found among those 
not belonging to the Evangelical subgroup. If such were the case 
Evangelical respondents in our sample should show significantly higher 
levels of alienation than non-evangelical respondents. What does the data 
reveal?23 
Respondents were asked a series of general questions regarding trust in 
government. When asked if they trusted the government, "always", "most 
of the time", or "only some of the time", a majority in both groups 
reported that they trusted the government only some of the time. The 
percentage difference between Evangelicals (60.4%) and non-evangelicals 
(58.2%) was small and statistically not significant. Other items designed to 
tap trust include the subject of interest group power and the ethical nature 
of public officials. In response to the question "In whose interest is the 
government run-for the benefit of all or for a few big interests?" 
Evangelicals turn out to be somewhat cynical but no more so than the non-
evangelicals. Fifty-eight percent of both groups responded that they believed 
21 
government (federal) favored " a few big interests" and did not rule int 
,common interest. A larger percentage of Evangelicals (51 %) thought thhe 
there were "quite a few" crooks in the government while only 40.6% oft: 
non-evangelicals were willing to so classify elected officials and presumable 
career civil servants. This is still not a significant difference, howev Y, 
Evangelicals seem to entertain a generally jaundiced view of governmt · 
and politics which may be a measure of the predominant atti tudes n} 
Americans at most times but particularly true during the Reagan era. 0 
T ABLE I: LEVEL OF TR U T IN TH E MAJOR GOVER NME TA L IN TIT UTIO NS OF T H E UMT EO STAT ES 
TRUST IN EVA1'GE LICAL ,o N-E\A!"-GELICAL 
' Hl6H MEDI UM LOW HIGH MEOI M LO" 
Conarc.u• 27 94 40 23 76 43 lOJ (16.8",) (S8 .41':'1) (24.81':',) (16 .21'.'1) (lJ .Jr,) (lO.J",1 
U.S Supreme Counb 61 66 29 64 l7 20 l9J ()9 . Jr,) (42 . ) .. ,) (I .6r,) (45,4"'•> (40,4r,1 ( 14 2 t) 
U.S. Prc:)1dcnc)"' 74 49 39 l4 lO 38 JO, (4S .7"1) (l0 .2 .. ,) (24 . I"•) ()8 .0 •> (lS.2"•> (26. "•) 
S1a1c Go"crnmcnt" 43 87 JO 28 88 2l lOI (26 .9"•) (54 .4 .. ,) (18 .8 .. ,) (19 .9"'t) t62.4 .. ,) (17.7",1 
L01:al Go"crnmcni~ 46 7l 39 JO 19 Jl JOI {28.8"•1 (46 9~,, (24.4 ... ) (21 .) .. ,) (l6 .0"tl (22.7"1} 
OTE: All !he " Oon'1 Krv,\flis" and "No An\ "crs " ha..,c b«n c,u:ludcd from lh1~ Table . 
a x• • P < .S6l4; Cramer's V • .06 d X' • P < .2953; Cramtr 's V • .09 
b X1 • P < .4426; Cramer's V • .07 c X' • P < .2259: Cramer's V • .09 
c X' • P < .3985: Cramer's V • .01 
When these statements were broken down into specific governmental 
institutions, no statistically significant differences appear either. 
Respondents were asked if they had high trust, medium trust, or low trust in 
the U.S. President, the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S Congress. A 
sizeable percent of our respondents show a high degree of trust in the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Thirty-nine percent of the Evangelicals and 45.5% of the 
non-evangelicals indicated high trust in this institution while 42.30/o of 
Evangelicals and 40.4% of non-evangelicals demonstrated a medium level 
of trust. Since the Supreme Court has handed down abortion, prayer, and 
Bible reading decisions that have been almost universally decried by 
Evangelicals, it is surprising to find such a significant degree of trust in the 
institution itself. 
Similarly, the U.S. Presidency enjoys a high degree of trust from all 
respondents. Forty-six percent of Evangelicals express high trust in the 
President while 38% of the non-evangelicals do so. Also 30.20/o of 
Evangelicals and 35.2% of non-evangelicals revealed medi um trust. Our 
data hardly indicate a lack of trust and alienation and the diffe rence be-
tween the two groups is not statistically significant. The last natio nal institu-
tion examined for trust, the U.S. Congress, did not fare as well among our 
respondents. Only 16.8% of the Evangelicals and 16.2% of the non-
evangelicals expressed high trust in Congress. Again both gro ups seem to be 
about equally unimpressed with the institution . Congress fared even le s 
well than lawyers in terms of high public trust and barely held its own with 
organized labor! Such findings should not, however, be misconstrued to 
suggest a terribly low level of trust in the legislative branch, as 58.40/o of 
Evangelicals and 53.5% of non-evangelicals responded that they do have a 
"medium" level of trust in this institution. 
State government evoked a slightly higher degree of trust than Con-
22 
ress with 27% of _the Eva~ge~cal~ and ~0OJo of the non -evangelical~ ex-
g essing high trust m those mst1tut10ns. Fifty-four percent of Evangelicals 
pr d 62.4% of non-evangelicals expressed a medium level of trust. Again, we 
:? d no significan t difference between Evangelicals and non-evangelicals in 
1
~ard to their trust in state government. Local government does not fare 
:fgnificantly better than did state govern~ent. Twenty-ni~e percen~ of t~e 
Evangelicals and 21_% _o~ the n?n-evangehcals reported high trust m their 
Jocal officials. No s1gmf1cant differences appear between the two groups. 
The same general lack of high trust towards institutions of American 
overnmen t is also found in the major institutions of American society and 
!gain, there . are ~ew differences found _ bet~ee~ Eva~gelicals ~nd non-
evangelicals m this regard. One exception hes m feelings of high trust 
towards major business corporations in the United States. More non-
evangelicals (27%) have high trust in major corporations than do 
Evangelicals (16.3%) - (X 2 = p < .06; Cramer's V = .13). Exactly why 
this is the case is puzzling unless it is due to the fact many Evangelicals come 
from working class backgrounds rather than a professional background. 
HBLE 2: LEVEL OF TRUST IN THE MAJOR INSTIT UTION S OF THE UN ITED ST AT ES 
TRUST I EVANGELICAL NON -EVANGELICAL N = 
HIGH MEDIUM LOW HIGH MEDI UM LOW 
\1aJ0r Corpora1ions11 26 94 40 38 69 34 301 
(16.31171) (l8 .8~•J (25.00'J~) (27.0', '1) (48.9 111) (24. 10/o) 
oraaniz.cd Rclig1onb l7 11 23 JJ l9 49 2\/8 
(36.30/o) (49.00'/oJ (14.6~,) {2).40'/1) (41.8'1•) (34 .8','o) 
oraamzcd Labor 2l 69 6l 23 ll 64 JOI (15.70/o) (4).4'1,J (40 .9%) ( 16 .2%) ()8 .71f/o) (45 . l 'lo) 
um,crsi11n and Colleges.a 70 71 14 70 58 12 29.S 
(45 .2'/o) (4l .S~,) (9.0'11) (50.0 1/1) (41.40Jo) (8.6'1o) 
The Prm and T. V. News•· 46 60 ll 38 64 39 302 
(28.6%) (37.J~,) (34 .2•/o) (27 .0'lo) (45.41/o) (27.7t/o) 
o«1or>1 68 69 2l 6l l) 24 304 
(42 .00J,) (42.611Jo) (LS.4°11J,) {45 .8'7o) (31.JIIJo) (16.9'1o) 
Law)'trs• 34 86 40 JI 70 41 302 
(21.3'1,) (l).8~,) (2l.0t/o) (21.80'/o) (49.Jt/o) (28.9'1,) 
Pubhc School T cacheu h 81 69 II 7l 44 23 303 
(l0 .J~,) (42.9'1,) (6.8 81•) (52.8 1/o) ()I0'lo) (16.2%) 
NOTE; All the "Don't Knows" and "No Answers" have been excluded from 1his Table . 
a X',,. P <. 0674; Cramer's V = . 13 e X' = P <.3 166; Cramer's V = .08 
b X' c P < .0002; Cramer's V = .24 f XJ = P < .6458; Cramer's V = .OS 
e X' = P< .6998; Cramer's V ~== .04 gX : = P <. 697 J;Cramcr' s V = .04 
d x: • P <.7 036; Cramer's V :a:: .04 hX' ., P <.0 l20 ;Cramc r'sV = . 17 
A second major difference in degree of trust towards a major institu-
tion in American society comes, not surprisingly, in the case of organized 
religion. Non-evangelicals generally have low (35%) or medium (42%) trust 
in organized religion. Only 23% of them express high trust in American 
religious institutions. In contrast, only 15% of the Evangelicals express low 
trust in organized religion while 49% express medium trust and 36% say 
they have high trust in organized religion. The differences are also 
statistically significant (X 2 = p < .002). 
Relatively few respondents had high trust in oganized labor with 
Evangelicals reporting only 15.7% high trust and non-evangelicals 16.2%. 
Large percentages indicated low trust towards organized labor in both 
groups. Forty-one percent of Evangelicals and 45% of non-evangelicals 
reported low trust here. This is not statistically significant. 
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One might anticipate that Evangelical groups would have lower trust . 
television news and the print media since much of what is reported th •n 
could be interpreted as threatening to Evangelical values. Howev er wh~e 
neither group had very high trust in the press or TV news, ther e V:ere 1 e 
significant differences here either. Twenty-seven percent of the nono 
evangelicals and 28.60Jo of the Evangelicals expressed high trust in press an~ 
television news while about the same percentages expressed low trust. 
An intriguing question is how Evangelical groups, as well as the genera} 
public, respond to American colleges and universities as a whole. Are 01 
institutions of higher education hotbeds of atheism and secular humanis~ 
or are they trustworthy institutions? Apparently they are not as great a 
source of concern as some "electronic preachers" would have us believe 
Forty-five percent of the Evangelicals expressed high trust in colleges and 
universities while 500Jo of the non-evangelicals did so. This is no t a signifi. 
cant difference between the two groups. 
A surprising discovery occurs when we turn to degree of tru st in public 
school teachers. Given the controversy over public prayer and Bible reading 
in the public schools one would expect to find low trust among Evangelicals 
in our public school teachers but a higher degree of trust among non. 
evangelicals . This turns out not to be the case since both groups have a high 
degree of trust in public school teachers (X 2 = p < .01; Cramer's V == .17). 
A possible explanation for this is that Evangelicals have confidence in 
public school teachers and do not blame them personally for the national 
policies which they are required to carry out . Since the Supre me Court en-
joys high trust from both groups of respohdents, it would ap pear to be the 
specific decisions which are disliked rather than the institution itself. The 
non-evangelical attitude may reflect more of a lack of confi dence in the 
competency of public school teachers . Our data cannot fully explain the 
reasons for this finding so we can only speculate as to the reason for it. 
Finally, our respondents did not differ significantly in the degree of 
trust they express in attorneys and physicians. While physici ans enjoy 
relatively high trust among both groups of respondents, lawyers always 
receive only medium to low trust. This may be due to the association of 
physicians with modern "miracle cures" while attorneys are mo re identified 
with lawsuits and rules and regulations. 
Overall, the data on alienation in this study do reveal a substantial 
degree of alienation and distrust among our respondents towards the 
government and other major American institutions. However , the data do 
not reveal significant differences between Evangelicals and no n-evangelicals 
in these areas. On the basis of our sample the rise of the Eva ngelical move-
ment cannot be explained as a product of alienation from the major institu-
tions of American society. 
Political Involvement 
An additional test of the alienation model is the extent to which 
Ev~gelicals and non-evangelicals differ with respect to politic al involve-
ment. While our examination in this area is not inclusive, we do feel the 
data provide some useful insights. Evangelicals do not appear to be opting 
out of the political system by any means. Seventy-eight perce nt of them 
identify with one of the two major parties (only 270Jo classify them selves as 
Independent and 40Jo refused to answer). In fact, fewer Evange licals iden-
24 
·fy themselves as Independent than is the case with non-evangelicals, as 
~•zCIJo of the latter group fit this category. What is surprising is the fact that 
evangelicals have remained firmly attached to this two-party system despite 
he systematic castigation of policy makers in both parties by the supposed 
~'spokesm~n" of the Evangeli~al constituency. '!1 e feel t_he strength of party 
'dentificat1on among Evangelicals may be partially attributed to the age of 
:his subgroup, as Evangelicals are found in the 36-45 and over 65 age 
roUP• Research on partisanship demonstrates that Independents are more 
TTkelY to be found among young rather than middle aged or older voters; the 
latter cohorts having acquired a party affiliation prior to the era of partisan 
atrophy. i• 
One of the foremost problems allegedly facing Evangelical leaders hop-
ing to have a major impact on the domestic political system has been the low 
voter turnout traditionally associated with Evangelical constituents. 
However, our data indicate that 86.4% of the Evangelicals are registered to 
vote and only 14% are not. In contrast, 76.8% of the non-evangelicals are 
registered to vote and 23.2% are unregistered. Since one must be registered 
in most voting districts in order to vote, this must be an encouraging 
statistic to Evangelical leaders. In any case, we simply do not find that 
Evangelicals are so alienated or feel so politically inefficacious as to have 
ceased total participation in the political system. 
Life Style Concerns Model 
Page and Clelland in their study of the Kanawha County textbook con-
troversy have argued that the politics of life style concerns is the master con-
cept which should be applied to all struggles involving noneconomic belief 
systems. is According to the life style concern model, conflict among groups 
over noneconomic issues should be interpreted not as an attempt to defend 
against declining prestige but as an attempt to defend a way of life, and to 
control the means of production of life styles. 
Jerry Falwell and other fellow preachers of the New Christian Right 
have endorsed "Christian issue positions," meaning morally based legisla-
tion and policies and a public commitment to religious faith. Recent public 
policies in the areas of ERA, prayers in public schools and abortion are 
described as antithetical to Biblical principles and evidence of declining 
Christian values, decency and morality from public life style. They have 
argued in favor of a constitutional ban on abortion, the death penalty, 
prayers in public schools, censorship of books in public libraries, and have 
opposed the ERA, sex education in public schools and the distribution of 
"pornographic" material including "X-rated movies". 
To test the life style concerns model, we selected issues that the leaders 
of the New Christian Right have articulated. We would hypothesize that the 
Evangelical respondents would show more conservative attitudes in these 
issues reflecting their concerns over life style than would be the case with the 
non-evangelical respondents. 
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TABLE 3: POLI C Y PREFERENCES OF THE EVANGELI CAL AND ON-EVA CELICAL RESPO DENTS 
I E EVA CELI AL 
FAVOR OPPOSE 
Cons1i1u11onal Ban on Abomon• 8 l8 
(60.J-.) ()9 .7 .. ) 
ERA" SJ 88 
()7 .6 ... ) (62 .... , 
Death Penahf Ill JJ 
(77.4.,,,) (22.6"") 
Sex Educallon in Schoolsd 90 68 
(l7 .0'1t) (43.0 ... ) 
Consrnut1onaJ A mendment 10 ~ rm1t 
Pra)'crs in Pubhc Schoolsc Ill 27 
(82.9 ... ) (17. 1 ... ) 
Proh1b11 D1smbuuon or X- Ra1cd 
Movues1 I 14 4) 
(72.6r,) (27.4~,) 
Censorship of Boo.._s from 
Public Library' 7l 81 
(4) .9 .. ,) (49.4 .. ,} 
OTE: All the " Oon'1 Kno"'s" and " o Ans~crs" h11o-c bttn excluded from thu; Table. 
a X' • P< .0001; Phi • .ll 
b X1 • P< . 180); Phi • .09 
c X' • P< .0371; Phi • . ll 
d X' • ,P< .0001; Phi • .30 
c X' • P <.0001; Phi • .29 
fX ' • P <.OOOl;Phi • .34 
a X' • P< .0001 ; Gamma • -. 56 
ON-EVA CELICAL 
FAVOR OPP E 
36 94 (27.7 .. ) (72.3 ... ) 
ll 6) 
(46.6 ... ) (l l .4 ... ) 
Bl 4l 
(6l .4~oj (J4.6 ... ) 
117 22 
(84.2",) (ll .8", ) 
10 ll 
(l6.0 ... ) (440 .,t) 
SI 80 ()8 .9.,,) (61, I "•) 
24 109 
(17.l •I (78 4• ,, 
.... 
276 
219 
l'6 
291 
28) 
288 
-
One of the major political issues in American politics to day turns on 
the Roe v. Wade Supreme Court decision which lega lized abortion for 
women during the first tri-mester of pregnancy and even during the second 
tri-mester under certain circumstances . Members of the " Right -to-Life" 
movement (which includes, among others, such diverse grou ps as Roman 
Catholics and Baptists) have supported a federal constitutio nal amendment 
which would h~ve the effect of overturning Roe v. Wade and proh ibiting all 
abortions save under extraordinary circumstances. This prop osed amend-
ment has relatively little support among non-evangelicals. Only 27. 7% of 
the latter favor such a constitutional ban . In contrast, persons identified as 
Evangelicals overwhelmingly support such a ban. Over 60% of Evangelicals 
support the proposal (X 2 = p < .0001; Phi = .33) - (See Ta ble 3). 
Another proposed constitutional amendment which receives strong 
support from Evangelicals is that which would permit praye r and Bible 
reading in public schools. Eighty-three percent of Evangelic als are in favor 
of it while only 56% of the non-evangelicals express a simi lar opinion (X 2 = 
p < .0001; Phi = .29). Those categorized as Evangelical do no t favor the 
ERA and they are not significantly different in this regard from the non-
evangelical. Perhaps this indicates the effectiveness of the cam paign waged 
by opponents of the ERA that at the present time majorities in both groups 
are opposed to the measure. Thirty-eight percent of Evange licals favored 
the ERA and 46.6% of the non-evangelicals did so . 
The rightness or justice of the death penalty continues to be a con-
troversial question in America and we asked our respondents their opinion 
on this question . The New Testament injunction "judge not lest ye be judged" 26 
might suggest an aversion to such a harsh penalty. 
However, the Hebraic injunction "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a 
tooth" or the call for swift and certain punishment seems to appeal to 
Evangelicals more than the New Testament message. Evange licals were 
overwhelmingly in favor of the death penalty for serious crimes . Over 77f/o 
favored it. In contrast, only 65.4% of the non-evangelicals did so (X 2 = 
p < .03; Phi = .13) . It would appear that the death penalty is popular 
among both groups but more popular among the Evangelica ls. 
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sex education is another issue that has long been a target of conser-
tive religious and political groups who attack such programs in the public 
vahools on the grounds that they are transmitting improper values, values 
\ich should properly be taught at home. Those taking the opposite point :r view have countered with ~he argum_ents that vener 7al dise~se, teen-age 
regnancies, and other undes1ra~le s?c1al problems eXJs~ p~ec1sely because 
Parents did not teach sex edu~at1on m the home . A _maJonty amoi:ig. both 
~vangelicals and non-evangelicals favor sex education but a stat1st1cally 
ignificant difference appears between the two groups. Fifty-seven percent 
f the Evangelicals favor sex education, but a huge majority, 84.20/o of the 
~on-evangelicals favor it (X 2 = p < .001; Phi = < .29). 
Pornography has long been a matter of concern among conservative 
religious groups. While pornography is not synonymous with x-rated films, 
a number of Evangelicals see it as a social problem. When asked if x-rated 
movies constitute a moral problem for their communities and should they 
be banned, 72.60/o of the Evangelicals wished to do so. A majority of non-
evangelicals did not regard x-rated films as a community problem at all. Only 
J8.90Jo of the non-evangelicals would ban x-rated films (X 2 = p < .0001; Phi 
== .34). 
Apparently Evangelicals are much more willing to approve of remov-
ing books from public libraries which they find morally objectionable than 
are non-evangelicals. Forty-four percent of the Evangelicals said that books 
with objectionable passages should be removed from libraries while only 
I 70/o of the non-evangelicals thought so. Seventy-eight percent of the non-
evangelicals disagreed with removing books from libraries and 49.40/o of the 
Evangelicals did so. A significant difference does exist between the two 
groups (X 2 = p<.0001; Cramer's V = .30) . 
In summary, our data does provide support for the life style concerns 
model. Evangelical respondents do indeed take a significantly more con er-
vative position on life style issues than do non-evangelicals. However, it 
hould be noted that Evangelical respondents do not constitute a monolithic 
group. On issues such as sex education in public schools and censorship of 
books from public libraries, Evangelical respondents do show some liberal 
tendencies, though relative to the non-evangelical respondents, they emerge 
as more conservative on both of these issues. The life style concerns model 
provides a conceptually meaningful framework for understanding the issue 
po itions of the New Christian Right leaders and their followers. The 
politics of life style concerns involves individuals who have definite, ex-
pre sed policy goals. Their political activity is for all practical purposes in-
di tinguishable from that engaged in by economc interest groups pursuing 
economic goals through political channels. 
Conclusions 
The Evangelicals identified in our sample do not fit into the mold pro-
vided by the classic alienation model. Evangelicals, while reflecting con-
iderable trust in a few institutions, also display a sizeable amount of 
general alienation, especially toward government and politicians. However, 
compared to the non-evangelical population, little difference exists between 
the two groups. The similarity in attitudes suggests that Evangelicals do not 
constitute a uniquely alienated subgroup. 
When trust in specific governmental and social institutions was ex-
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plored, a lower level of alienation was discovered among both populati 
This is somewhat perplexing, as one must wonder why the respondent:ns, 
alienated from government in general, but not the component parts of t:e 
structure. Perhaps this is due to the fact that government in the gene s 
sense is somewhat intangible, and therefore less worthy of trust and c ra.t 
fidence while individual institutions are more readily identifiab le. It apr:;;· 
to be the individuals holding governmental positions and the policies th 8 
espouse that Evangelicals find unacceptable. ey 
It is the second model tested, the life style concerns model, that is mo 
fruitful in explaining the Evangelical or New Christian Right phenomen st 
Our data d?es show signifi~ant differen~es betw:en the Evangelical an~ 
non-evangehcal respondents m regard to life style issues. Evangelicals con. 
sistently take a more conservative stand on these matters than do non. 
evangelicals. Moreover, Evangelical respondents reflect concerns with those 
issues that have been articulated by the leaders of the New Christian Right 
persons such as Jerry Falwell, James Robinson and others, who urge thei; 
followers to defeat the "Humanists" and elect individuals who will put 
"Christian values" into public policies. 
Evangelicals do indeed appear to be defending a style of life through 
the electoral process. In this sense it is noteworthy that they are behaving 
much like conventional economic interest groups, using the political process 
to achieve their goals, although, clearly life style goals are different in 
nature from economic ones. It is dissatisfaction with public policies affect-
ing individual life style concerns which has motivated Evangelical political 
activity rather than alienation from major institutions in American society. 
Life style concerns appear to be the major issue over which a potential con-
stituency can be mobilized. Whether this potential translates into a suc-
cessful political movement is another issue. 
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